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NEPA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN "IMPACT
COGNIZATION" STANDARD:
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. v. PEOPLE
AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY
This country entered a new era in environmental protection with
the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).1 NEPA requires2 all federal agencies3 to prepare an envi-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
Previously, Congress had attempted a piecemeal approach to environmental legis-
lation. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, ch. 360, §§ 1-7, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)); Water Quality Improvement Act, ch. 758, §§ 1-8, 62
Stat. 1155 (1956) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1265 (1982)); Environmental
Quality Act of 1970, ch. 56, § 203, 84 Stat. 114 (1970) (reclassified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370 (1982)). For a concise summary of environmental legislation and regu-
lation, see J. RAU & D. WOOTEN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS HANDBOOK
§§ 1-3 to 1-11 (1980). In addition, on at least two occasions Congress unsuccessfully
attempted to establish a national environmental policy before the passage of NEPA:
The Resource Conservation Act, S. 2549, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC.
15,923, 16,455 (1950), and The Ecological Research and Survey Act, S. 2282, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REc. 15,112 (1966).
2. Originally, Congress intended that Environmental Impact Statements be re-
quired prior to or in conjunction with the planning and constructing of any federal
action. See, e.g., Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d
378 (2d Cir. 1975) (the Postal Service had to prepare an EIS before it could begin
construction of a new building). See also SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-96, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969) (Congress included the EIS requirement as an "action-forc-
ing" measure to meet the goals of NEPA).
The "prerequisite" requirement has been altered or eliminated in many cases. For
example, in 1972, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to allow nuclear power
plant operators to petition for temporary operating licenses for nuclear power plants
prior to full NEPA compliance. Comment, Offshore Oil Development and the Demise
of NEP,4, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 83, 83 (1978). See infra note 4 for a discussion
of the four threshold determinations a federal agency must make before an EIS is
required.
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1982). "[Flederal agency [includes] all agencies of
the Federal Government . . .[except] the Congress, the Judiciary, or the President,
including the performance of staff functions for the President. . . ." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.12 (1983). Courts have interpreted NEPA as binding on all Federal agencies.
See, e.g., Shfller v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Congress imposed,
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ronmental impact statement4 (EIS) for "major federal actions5 signifi-
in . . . [42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)], a substantive obligation upon all federal agencies");
Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973) ("NEPA is a clear mandate to all
federal agencies"). Courts have held that NEPA requires only federal agencies to
prepare EISs. See, e.g., United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 607 (3d
Cir. 1974) (NEPA not applicable to private or state actions), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975); Homeowner's Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 971,
975 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (municipality not required to comply with NEPA standards).
4. The EIS is a "detailed statement" describing the environmental impact on a
proposed action, unavoidable adverse environmental effects, proposed alternatives,
long-term verses short-term gains, irretrievable resources committed, and expert opin-
ions from interdisciplinary team members. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). The pur-
pose of the EIS is two-fold. First, the EIS acts as an environmental full disclosure
statement, requiring agencies to fully analyze the impact of human activities on the
environment. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1299
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). Second, the EIS assists agencies in
planning and decision-making, providing the public with information on the environ-
mental impact of a proposed action and encouraging public participation. American
Timber Co. v. Berglund, 473 F. Supp. 310, 312 (D.C. Mont. 1979); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1
(1983).
Before a federal agency is required to prepare an EIS, four threshold determina-
tions must be made. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). The initial inquiry is whether the
federal agency has made a "recommendation or a report on proposal." Id. See also
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (Court announced a two-part test to ascer-
tain the existence of a recommendation or report). Second, the agency must deter-
mine whether this recommendation or report on various proposals is for "legislation"
or for other "major federal actions." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). A legislative EIS
is defined as a "detailed statement required by law. . . [that] shall be considered part
of the formal transmittal of a legislative proposal to Congress .. " 40 C.F.R.
§ 1506.8(a) (1983). For a discussion of "major federal actions," see infra note 5. The
third determination is whether the legislation or major federal action "significantly
affects" the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). The
final determination is whether the proposed activity will affect the "quality of the
human environment." Id. See infra note 7. Cf. Comment, People Against Nuclear
Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Redening Environmental
Policy in the Stressful Aftermath of a Nuclear Accident, 18 NEw ENG. L. REv. 449,
454-55 (1983) (federal agency must assess its proposed action in terms of five thresh-
old determinations).
A number of decisions hold that a proposed government action will not require an
EIS because the connection between the action and environmental effect was too re-
mote. See, e.g., Assure Competitive Transp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir.
1980) (ICC policy allowing freer entry into interstate trucking market did not require
an EIS); Jim Walker Corp. v. FTC, 625 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1980) (FTC-ordered divest-
iture of industrial plant does not require an EIS even though plant may be sold to
known polluter); Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115 (9th Cir.
1979) (federal decision to buy an existing airport did not change environmental status
quo, hence it did not require an EIS), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1980); Committee for
Auto Responsibility (CAR) v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (leasing a gov-
ernment parking lot to a parking management firm does not require an EIS because it
does not change environmental status quo); National Citizens Comm. for Broadcast-
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cantly affecting6 the quality of the human environment."7 NEPA
ing v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FCC decision to exempt product adver-
tising from fairness doctrine does not require EIS even though it may result in more
advertisements for environmentally dangerous products), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926
(1977); Cobble Hill Ass'n v. Adams, 470 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (program to
repair existing highway requires no EIS).
5. As defined in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1983), "major federal action" includes "ac-
tions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal
control and responsibility. . . including projects and programs entirely or partly fi-
nanced, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies. . . ." Id.
Some of the judicially developed criteria to determine which actions are major in-
clude the magnitude of the project, the government's financial commitment to the
project, its total financial cost, the number of federal agencies involved, the duration
of the project, and the size of the area impacted. F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION IN A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 34-35 (1981). See, e.g., Waterbury Action to
Conserve Our Heritage, Inc. v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1979) (major
federal action means that agency must comply with NEPA "so long as it retains sig-
nificant control over the project"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[mlajor federal actions must be as-
sessed with view to overall cumulative impact of [otherwise individually minor] pro-
posed and related actions and projects"), rev'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 390 (1976);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 366-67
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (federal agency must expend "substantial planning, time, [and] re-
sources" to be considered a major federal action).
Several courts have ruled that federal involvement in a program may be so minimal
that the action does not qualify as a "federal" action and thus does not require an
EIS. See, e.g., Bradley v. Department of Hous. and Urb. Dev., 658 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.
1981) (use of federal funds under a block grant program to finance planning of an
urban renewal project does not require an EIS when federal government has no con-
trol over substantive contents of plan); City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir.
1972) (tentative allocation of federal funds for state project does not convert project
into federal action and does not require an EIS). But see Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252
(4th Cir. 1974) (when state accepts federal funds for a project, state must return those
funds to prevent federal regulations from applying to project); Silva v. Romney, 473
F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973) (HUD approval of federal funds for housing project created
sufficient federal involvement to make NEPA applicable). See generally Comment,
Environmental Law: What ir "Major"in "'Major FederalActions?": Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 485 (1975) ("reasonableness"
standard of judicial review with respect to agency's determination of whether pro-
posed action will be major).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). A significant effect is one that has an "impor-
tant or meaningful effect, directly or indirectly, upon a broad range of aspects of the
human environment." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F.
Supp. 356, 367 (E.D.N.C. 1972). "Significantly" requires consideration of both con-
text and intensity. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1983). Context requires an analysis of the
significance of an action in a variety of geographical and temporal situations because
the significance depends upon the effects in the locality rather than in the world as a
whole. Id. § 1508.27(a). Intensity refers to the severity of the impact. Id.
§ 1508.27(b).
Under NEPA, federal agencies have broad discretionary powers to make good faith
1T984]
Washington University Open Scholarship
160 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 26:157
does not explicitly identify the environmental effects requiring prepa-
ration of impact statements.8 Courts identifying the cognizable ef-
fects, consequently, disagree about the types of environmental
impacts that require an EIS.9 In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People
determinations as to whether proposed actions are significant enough to require an
EIS. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973). See, e.g., Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979) (proposed Job Corp. Center did not require prep-
aration of an EIS since there were no allegations regarding significant impact on the
environment); Maryland-Nat'l Capitol Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States
Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1039 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (proposed bulk mailing facility
would increase stormwater and oil runoff, a significant effect, therefore an EIS was
required).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). "Human environment" is defined in 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.14 (1983):
[Human environment] . . . shall be interpreted comprehensively to include the
natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with the envi-
ronment. . . . This means that economic and social effects are not intended by
themselves to require preparation of a[n]. ..[EIS]. .... When an. . .[EIS] is
prepared and economic or social and natural or physical environmental effects
are interrelated, then the. . .[EIS] will discuss all of these effects on the human
environment.
Id. (emphasis added). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332, 4344 (1982) (additional ref-
erences to human environment). See generally Show & Robinchaux, Council on Envi.
ronmental Quality: Defning Human Environment, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 201 (1980)
("human environment . . . refers to the foreseeable, mutual relationship of people
and their physical surroundings").
8. NEPA's language has been characterized as "opaque" and "woefully ambigu-
ous." Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing New York v.
United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) and Voight, The National Envi.
ronmental Policy Act and the Independent Regulatory Agency, 5 NAT. R. LAWYER 13
(1972), respectively). One commentator, when discussing the legal ramifications of
NEPA, concluded that the law's "instructions" for preparing an EIS are not specific
enough to insure that an agency will fully examine the environmental effects of its
proposed projects. Gillette, Trans-Alaska Pipeline Impact Study Receives Bad Re-
views, 171 SCIENCE 1130, 1130 (1971).
The Council on Environmental Quality provides some guidance by requiring agen-
cies to consider three types of impacts or effects (direct, indirect and cumulative)
when preparing an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1983). Direct effects "are caused by the
action and occur at the time and place." Id. § 1508.8. Indirect effects are caused by
the action but occur later in time or further removed in distance, although still reason-
ably foreseeable. Id. Cumulative impact is "the impact on the environment which
results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present,
and reasonably foreseeable future actions. . . ." Id. § 1508.7. For a related view of
what constitutes an environmental impact, see Bacow, Exploring Environmental Irn-
pacts: Beyond Quantity to Quality, 85 TECH. REv. 32, 34-35 (1982).
9. See Comment, People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission: PotentialPsychological Harm Under NEP.4, 32 CATH. U.L. REV.
495, 501 (1983). The author notes that the "efforts of the courts to define the impacts
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Against Nuclear Energy,"° the United States Supreme Court held that
risk of a nuclear accident is not a cognizable environmental effect
requiring assessment in an EIS. l 1
On March 28, 1979, the Three-Mile Island nuclear facility"z near
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was the site of the "worst nuclear accident
Americans have yet experienced."' 3 After the accident in Reactor
Congress intended NEPA to encompass have produced no definitive test .... Id.
Also, the author cites two cases illustrating the differing judicial interpretations of
NEPA's scope in terms of the EIS: Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland,
428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977) (a broad interpretation of the scope of an EIS), and
First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (court construes
the EIS requirements more narrowly). Comment, supra, at 501 n.40.
Other federal court decisions reflect the problem of interpreting NEPA's language.
See, e.g., Image of Greater San Antonio, Tex. v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978)
(must be a primary impact on the environment before social or economic effects will
be discussed in an EIS); Chelesa Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv.,
516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975) (EIS required for a project where social consequences for
environment may be greater than physical impact); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F.
Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (EIS is a requirement for a project that has equally im-
portant effects on the physical and non-physical environments). See generally Mc-
Garity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L. REV. 801
(1977); Note, Environment Law Statutory Interpretations-Factors to be Considered in
Making a Threshold Determination that an Environmental Impact Statement is Neces-
sary Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419
(1979),
10 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
11. 103 S. Ct. at 1563.
12 The Three-Mile Island nuclear facility, located on an island in the Susque-
hanna River, consists of two nuclear reactors. 1979 N.R.C. ANN. REP. 11, 11. Both
reactors, built by the Babcock and Wilcox Company, a subsidiary of McDermott,
Inc., are operated by the Metropolitan Edison Co., a subsidiary of General Public
Utilities, Inc. of New Jersey. D. FORD, THREE-MILE ISLAND: THIRTY MINUTES TO
MELTDOWN 23 (1981).
13. People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n
678 F.2d 222, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983). For five days, Three
Mile Island was the scene of panic and hysteria. The Governor of Pennsylvania rec-
ommended an evacuation of all pregnant women and small children and approxi-
mately 125,000 people left their homes. 1979 N.R.C. ANN. REP. 17, 18. For a
chronology of events surrounding the TMI accident, see D. MARTIN, THREE-MILE
ISLAND: PROLOGUE OR EPILOGUE? 227-31 (1980).
The President's commission on the TMI accident, established by President Carter
to conduct a "comprehensive investigation of the accident," Exec. Order No. 12,130, 3
C.F.R. 380 (1980) and prepare a report of its findings, found that "[tihe major health
effect of the accident appears to have been on the mental health of the people living in
the region of the Three-Mile Island and of the workers at TMI." REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE-MILE ISLAND-THE NEED
FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 35 (1979).
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Unit Number 2 (TMI-2), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC),14 ordered the companion reactor, TMI-1, to remain in its
scheduled shutdown 5 pending an investigation to determine if it
could safely resume operations. 6 People Against Nuclear Energy
(PANE) 7 intervened in the restart proceedings, alleging that NEPA
required the NRC to analyze psychological stress and community
well-being in its supplemental EIS' 8 before deciding whether to
restart TMI- 1.' When the NRC did not take evidence of PANE's
14. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established by the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (1982). The Act abolished the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1954)), and transferred all licensing and regulatory authority
from the AEC to the NRC and the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012(d), 2133(d), 5814(c), 5814(F), and 5842 (1982).
15. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,461, at 40,461 (1979). Every five years a nuclear reactor is
required to shut down for refueling, scheduled maintenance and inspection. 1979
N.R.C. ANN. REP. 11, 11. The NRC required TMI-l to remain in this shutdown
phase even though the reactor was undamaged by the accident. Id.
16. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,461, at 40,461 (1979). The NRC published notice of a hearing
specifying the safety-related issues it would consider. Metropolitan Edison Co., 10
N.R.C. 141, 141 (1979). The NRC invited interested parties to submit briefs on the
psychological stress issue to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB). Id. The
ASLB, established under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982) (for recent developments of this Act, see supra note 14),
was formed by the NRC to conduct public hearings and specify the issues appropriate
for consideration to the restart process. 10 N.R.C. at 142.
17. PANE, an association of Harrisburg-area residents, is opposed to further op-
eration of either Three-Mile Island reactor. 103 S. Ct. at 1557 (1983).
18. A supplemental EIS is required when the federal agency makes either "sub-
stantial changes in a proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns or
... [ascertains] significant new circumstances or information relevant to environ-
mental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.9(c)(1)(i), (ii) (1983). See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
City of New York, 672 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1982) (supplemental EIS not required after
nearby theater became listed on National Register of Historic Places because the EIS
had adequately discussed historic aspects of theater); National Indian Youth Council
v. Watt, 664 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1981) (supplemental EIS not required when the only
change was narrowing the proposed surface mining area); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1981) (supplemental EIS was required for U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers waterway project because changes in traffic levels, straight-
ening river, increased land use, and new lake shape were substantial); Warm Springs
Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980) (although supplemental
EIS was not required after new data was obtained on length of earthquake fault line
and its effect on proposed dam, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had a duty to
reevaluate this information). The supplemental EIS should be prepared, circulated
and filed in the same fashion as a draft or final EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(4) (1983).
19. Metropolitan Edison Co., 12 N.R.C. 607, 607 (1980). Previously, the ASLB
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contentions, 20 PANE appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit.21 A sharply divided court held that the
NRC had improperly failed to consider whether the risk of an acci-
dent at TMI-1 might cause psychological harm22 to residents of the
surrounding area.23 The Supreme Court reversed.24
had concluded that psychological stress should be considered under NEPA. I1
N.R.C. 297, 297 (1980). Because a majority of the four NRC Commissioners voted
not to include psychological stress in the study, it was rejected. People Against Nu-
clear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222, 224-25
(D C. Cir. 1982),rey'd, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983). The NRC concluded that TMI-I could
resume operations without the preparation of a supplemental EIS assessing the psy-
chological harm and community well-being factors. 12 N.R.C. 607, 607 (1980). See
supra note 18 for a discussion of supplemental EIS.
20. PANE had two basic contentions. First, renewed operation of TMI-1 would
cause severe psychological distress to PANE's members and others living in the vicin-
ity of the reactor. 103 S. Ct. at 1559 n.2. Second, renewed operation of TMI-1 would
cause severe harm to the well-being of communities in the vicinity of TMI-1. Id. For
PANE's specific contentions, see id.
21 People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 678 F.2d at 225.
22. Traditionally, courts have required physical manifestations in tort to avoid
problems of proof and to limit damage awards in cases of psychological harm. Note,
Psychological Effects at NEPA's Threshold, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 336, 368 n.200 (1983).
See, e.g., Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264 (Ist Cir. 1969); Comment, Negli-
gently Inflicted Mental Distress. The Casefor an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237
(1971). This judicial reliance on physical manifestations should not, however, be im-
ported into the NEPA context. "NEPA is basically concerned with subtle psychologi-
cal effects whose consequences are not physiologically manifested." Note, supra, at
368 n.200. Psychological effects are defined as the "personal, nonphysical conse-
quences of agency actions." Id. at 340 n.37. See generally Comment, NEPA: Tping
and the Siting of Low-Income Public Housing.- The Dangers of Strycker's Bay Neigh-
borhood Council v. Karlen, 6 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 40-43 (1979) (distinguishing
psychological effects underlying a "tipping" claim from those recognized by NEPA,
on the basis of one's perception of the environmental change).
23. Before issuing its opinion on May 14, 1982, the court issued a brief judgment
on January 7, 1982 and an amended judgment on April 2, 1982. 678 F.2d at 235. The
judgments directed the NRC to assess whether significant new circumstances concern-
ing psychological health impacts had arisen since the original EIS was prepared prior
to the licensing of TMI-l. Id. In its May 14th opinion, the court addressed two main
issues: first, whether the damages to psychological health were cognizable under the
AEA or under NEPA, id. at 231; and second, whether the restart of the previously
licensed TMI-I was a "major federal action" requiring a continuing obligation to
comply with NEPA. Id. See supra note 5 (definition of major federal action).
Judge Wright, joined by Senior Judge McGowan, announced that NEPA requires
agencies to evaluate effects on human health and that "health encompasses psycho-
logical health." 678 F.2d at 228. The majority concluded that the post-traumatic
anxieties were severe enough to be considered under NEPA, but they remanded the
record to the NRC to determine whether a supplemental EIS was necessary. Id. at
1984]
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In 1969, Congress proclaimed that NEPA was the most significant
environmental legislation ever enacted.25 The legislative history of
NEPA suggests that Congress' foremost aim was controlling pollu-
tion of the physical environment.2 6 Language in the Act itself, how-
ever, indicates that NEPA protects more than just physical
resources.2 7 Goals of the Act include achieving the broadest possible
235. See supra note 4 (the threshold determinations of an EIS). Judge Wilkey's dis-
sent excluded psychological harm from the definition of health. Fear, like aesthetics,
he argued, is an individual perception, and "the majority sets no consistent standard
to determine when fear is real and justifiable." 678 F.2d at 242. A different majority,
consisting of Judge Wilkey and Senior Judge McGowan, concluded that psychologi-
cal health was not within the definition of health under the AEA. Id. at 254.
On the second issue, the majority, consisting of Judges Wright and McGowan, held
that "the Commission's statutory responsibilities over licensed nuclear facilities cre-
ated a continuing obligation to comply with the requirements of [NEPA]." Id. at 235.
24. 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
25. When introducing NEPA to the Senate, Senator Jackson praised the legisla-
tion as the "most significant measure in the area of natural resource policy ever con-
sidered by Congress." 115 CONG. REC. 19,008 (1969). Accord id at 40,416, 40,422
and 40,924. See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note 5, at 20-82 (recent in-depth analy-
sis of NEPA and its legal ramifications); Tobias & McLean, Of Crabbed Interpreta.
lions and Frustrated Mandates: The Effect of Environmental Policy Acts on Pre-
Existing Agency Authority, 41 MONT. L. REV. 177 (1980) (historical overview of
NEPA).
26. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2751 (report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, dealing with the final version of NEPA). The House Report included the
following editorial excerpt from the New York Times:
By land, sea, and air, the enemies of man's survival relentlessly press their attack.
The most dangerous of all these is man's own undirected technology. The radio-
active poison from nuclear tests, the runoff into rivers of nitrogen fertilizers, the
smog from automobiles, the pesticides in the food chains, and the destruction of
topsoil by strip mining are examples of the failure to foresee and control the
untoward consequences of modem technology.
1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2751, 2753 (quoting N.Y. Times, May 3, 1969).
See also 115 CONG. REc. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Senator Jackson, floor manager
of NEPA, stressing the danger from damage to air, land, and water); id. at 40,424
(statement of Representative Dingell, one of the sponsors of the Bill in the House,
claiming that the Act will protect the "air, aquatic, and terrestrial environments"); id.
at 40,426 (statement of Representative Garmaty, Chairman of the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee, warning that the only way to combat pollution of
natural resources is through legislation such as NEPA).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982) (declares NEPA's purposes in sweeping terms of
human health and welfare). See id § 4331 (Congress recognizes the profound im-
pact of man's activity on the interactions of all components of the natural environ-
ment); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct. at 1558
(NEPA was "designed to promote human health and welfare by alerting government
actors to the effect of their proposed actions on the environment."); City of Davis v.
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spectrum of "beneficial uses of the environment"28 and preserving
"historical" and "cultural" assets.2 9 The provisions of NEPA, while
stressing the need to safeguard the nation's physical resources, also
suggest that non-physical effects come within the ambit of NEPA.
The NEPA section containing the requirements for impact state-
ments, however, is ambiguous.3" Under this provision, an EIS is
mandatory for actions affecting the "human environment."'" Al-
though this is a very broad requirement, NEPA does not define what
constitutes the "human environment."32 NEPA also does not explain
whether non-physical impacts alone are cognizable under the Act.
Nor does the Act address the question of whether an EIS is
mandatory for projects that have both physical and non-physical en-
vironmental effects.33 NEPA simply does not identify the environ-
mental effects which are cognizable under the Act.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),3 4 created by
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (federal agencies have a duty to evaluate
all primary environmental impacts, since NEPA protects those interests for all
citizens).
28. NEPA's policies and goals are defined in § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982). See
also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2 (1983) (CEQ's interpretation of NEPA's policies). One com-
mentator summarized the policies and goals provision of NEPA as a procedural-sub-
stantive dichotomy since it mandates both results and methods. Leed, The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969: Is the Fact of Compliance a Procedural or Substan-
tive Question, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 303 (1975). Judicial interpretations of§ 4331
have recognized that although NEPA provides substantive goals, its mandate is essen-
tially procedural. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1979); Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1979). See also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1978)
(NEPA was enacted to ensure that environmental concerns are integrated into the
federal agency decisionmaking process); Shiffier v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 100 (3d
Cir. 1977) (federal agencies have a substantive obligation to consider environmental
concerns). See generallv F. SKILLERN, supra note 5, at 23 ("substantive policy of
NEPA is maximum protection and enhancement of environmental quality").
29. 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b)(3) (1982).
30. See supra note 8.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
32. See id. For other definitions and interpretations of human environment, see
supra note 7.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982).
34. Id. § 4343. The Council, composed of three members appointed by the Presi-
dent, "is to be responsive to environmental trends ... [and] carry out the policies
established by NEPA ..... Id. It functions as an investigatory and advisory body
to NEPA. Green County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 421
n.22 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1982).
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NEPA and empowered in 1970 to issue rules for the preparation of
impact statements, 35 promulgated regulations discussing the types of
environmental effects that may compel preparation of an EIS.3 6
Under the CEQ rules, the social or economic effects of government
actions do not by themselves require an EIS.3 7 An EIS will consider
non-physical, secondary impacts only when a project or proposal pri-
marily affects 8 the physical environment. Like NEPA, the CEQ
35. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970).
36. In 1978, an executive order granted the CEQ authority to promulgate regula-
tions designed to implement all of NEPA's procedural mandates. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3
(1983); Exec. Order No. 11,991 § 3(h), 3 C.F.R. 124 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1982), replacing in part Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 272 (1974). Previ-
ously, the CEQ was restricted to issuing guidelines confined solely to EIS. See CEQ
Final Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978); CEQ Appen-
dix to Final Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 57,488 (1980).
37. See supra note 7.
38. A primary impact involves some proposed action which will "directly" affect
the natural environment (air, water, biotic). See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Re-
sponsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (underground testing of a
nuclear warhead in Alaska), application for injunction deniedsub nom. Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971) (leasing tracts of
land on Outer Continental Shelf for oil exploration, drilling, and pipeline construc-
tion), motion for summary reversal denied, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 197 1), dismissed as
moot, 337 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 1972). But see Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d
864 (6th Cir. 1976) (closing Army base did not constitute direct, primary impact on
the human environment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977); National Ass'n of Gov't
Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1976) (realignment of Army mis-
sile programs from Colorado to other military bases is not a direct, primary impact),
aff'dsub nom. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Brown, 556 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
Secondary socioeconomic impacts include economic decisions that result in socio-
logical and psychological effects. The prevailing view of the courts, reflected in 40
C.F.R. § 1508.14, supra note 7, is that socioeconomic impacts are insufficient to trig-
ger the NEPA process. See, e.g., Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 609 F.2d at 345-46 (see supra note 6); Image of Greater San
Antonio, Tex. v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1978) (absent a primary impact
on the environment, socioeconomic effects are insufficient to trigger an EIS); National
Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (clos-
ing arsenal, although a major economic impact on the surrounding area, had minimal
environmental impact). But see Jackson County, Mo. v. Jones, 571 F.2d 1004, 1007
(8th Cir. 1978) (secondary, socio-economic effects of proposed closing of Army base
do fall within the environmental effects of which NEPA mandates agency evalua-
tion); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 245 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (secondary,
socio-economic effects of closing Army facility are sufficient to trigger NEPA).
If a proposed action will have a primary impact on the environment triggering an
EIS, secondary effects may be considered. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(3)(ii) (1983); Image
of Greater San Antonio, Tex. v. Brown, 570 F.2d at 522. See also Chelsea Neighbor-
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rules do not specify the extent of physical impact needed to require
assessment of non-physical effects.
Working under this imprecise legislative guidance, courts devel-
oped varying interpretations of the types of impacts cognizable under
NEPA. In Maryland-National Capitol Park and Planning Commission
v. United States Postal Service,39 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit laid a foundation for distinguishing between
various types of impacts cognizable under NEPA.4 ° In Maryland-Na-
tional, the local planning commission attempted to enjoin construc-
tion of a bulk mail center and parking facility on the grounds that the
Postal Service failed to prepare an EIS.41 The court noted several
impacts, including increased stormwater and oil runoff,4" additional
traffic,43 and adverse aesthetics," that compelled an assessment
under NEPA. The court distinguished these cognizable effects from
the socioeconomic fears arising from the proposed action.45 The
court held that only direct impacts on the physical environment, not
socioeconomic effects, trigger the EIS process.46
A number of courts have adopted a broader standard for EIS re-
quirements than that developed by the Maryland-National court.
These courts hold that physical and non-physical effects are cogniza-
ble under NEPA.47 Several decisions hold that the non-physical ef-
fects of a project are cognizable only if the primary impact of the
hood Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 379, 386-90 (2d Cir. 1975) (agen-
cies must consider both physical and social science data, such as emotional and
physical isolation of people in high-rise apartments, in an EIS).
39. 487 F,2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
40. Comment, supra note 9, at 501.
41. 487 F.2d at 1030.
42. Id at 1033. The increased stormwater and oil runoff could damage the hy-
drologic cycle and create health hazards. Id.
43. Id. Additional traffic, created by the influx of workers to the new facility,
would increase congestion and air pollution. Id.
44. Id. Building a loading facility adjacent to the highway would have an adverse
visual and aesthetic impact. Id.
45. Id. at 1037-40. See also 42 U.S.C. § 433 l(b)(2) (1982); Groton v. Laird, 353 F.
Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972) (Navy housing project).
46. 487 F.2d at 1038. The Court found that the EIS requirement of a "substantial
inquiry" was "not contemplated as a matter of reasonable construction of NEPA,
where the claim . . focus[es] on alleged esthetic impact and the matters at hand
pertain essentially to issues of individual and potentially diverse tastes." Id. at 1038-
39.
47. See supra note 38.
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action falls on the physical environment.48 In Breckenridge v. Rum-
sefld,49 the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that the economic im-
pacts of a project necessitated an EIS.5 ° The court ruled that closing
an Army base would not significantly affect the physical environ-
ment, although it would terminate thousands of jobs in the base area.
The court held that NEPA mandates an EIS only when the action has
a primary impact on the physical environment."t
Some courts hold that physical and non-physical impacts are
equally important in requiring an EIS.52 In McDowell v. Schles-
inger,53 plaintiffs argued that the Defense Department had to submit
an EIS before it could transfer an Air Force base from Missouri to
Illinois. 4 The plaintiffs contended that the closing would have dev-
astating social and economic consequences for Missouri communities
close to the base.5" The court found that the move would eliminate
thousands of jobs in Missouri, with significant social and economic
consequences.5 6 The court also ruled that the transfer of Air Force
personnel to Illinois would have a serious impact on natural re-
sources in that state.57 In concluding that the proposal required an
EIS, the court gave equal weight to the project's physical and non-
physical effects."
In Chelsea Neighborhood Association v. United States Postal Serv-
ice,59 the Second Circuit suggested that an EIS may be necessary
48. Id.
49. 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977).
50. 537 F.2d at 865.
51. Id. at 866.
52. See supra note 38.
53. 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
54. Id. at 254.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 236-37. The court found that the loss of jobs in Missouri would cause
serious unemployment problems in the communities adjacent to the base. The trans-
fer would create some population decreases in the area, as base personnel moved
away. This in turn would ravage the tax base for the area. Finally, the large numbers
of persons moving from the area would create a "glut" of empty houses, which would
increase vandalism. Id.
57. 404 F. Supp. at 234. The court expressed concern that there had been no
effort to examine the effect that the numbers of personnel transferred to Illinois would
have on water usage, sewage treatment, solid waste disposal and land use. Id.
58. 404 F. Supp. at 254.
59. 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit's clearest expression about
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where a project's non-physical impacts are more severe than the
physical ones. The court was concerned because the appellee had not
prepared an EIS for a plan to build a combination postal facility and
public housing project," and concluded that a failure to analyze the
project's non-physical impacts may have been the most serious prob-
lem arising from the lack of an impact statement. 6 The Chelsea
Neighborhood ruling suggests that social impacts may be cognizable
under NEPA even if the project's physical impacts are less important
than the non-physical ones. The Chelsea Neighborhood decision
stands in marked contrast to the Maryland-National ruling which
held that social and economic effects are not cognizable under
NEPA.
The cases discussed above all deal with aspects of the general ques-
the purpose of NEPA itself appeared in Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied sub nom. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). Hanly in-
volved a decision to construct a prison in a residential neighborhood in Manhattan.
Id. at 643. The General Services Administration (GSA), which oversaw the project,
had determined that an EIS was not needed for the project. Id at 664. The court
ruled that the impacts of the project did require an EIS. Although it found that the
jail project would affect the physical environment, the court was particularly con-
cerned with problems created by the inmates themselves, such as the possibility of
prisoner demonstrations. Id. at 647. In finding that such problems could require an
EIS, the court stated:
The National Environmental Policy Act contains no exhaustive list of so-called
"environmental considerations," but without question its aims extend beyond sew-
age and garbage and even beyond water and air pollution.... The Act must be
construed to include protection of the quality of life for city residents. Noise,
traffic, overburdened mass transportation systems, crime, congestion and even
availability of drugs all affect the urban "environment"....
Id. at 647 (emphasis added). Although the court did find that the project had some
impact on the physical environment, it was equally concerned with the non-physical
impacts of the project. The Hlanly court clearly held that non-physical impacts were
just as important as physical impacts under NEPA.
60. 516 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1975).
61, Id. at 388. In examining the potential effects of the project, the court stated in
part:
The required support services for housing are not adequately discussed. Gar-
bage collection is disposed of by a single paragraph. . . . What will be the ex-
pected noise and air pollution from those trucks is not adequately discussed.
A possibly more serious shortcoming of the analysis lies in the social, notphysi-
cal sciences. . . . We do not know whether informed social scientists would
conclude that the [housing project] would likely become a human jungle, unsafe
at night and unappealing during the day. The question must be faced, however,
by those who plan the project.
Id. (emphasis added).
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tion of the types of environmental effects that are cognizable under
NEPA. Cases involving the question of a project's psychological ef-
fects on humans are part of this broader body of law.62 In Hanly v.
Kleindienst,63 a citizens group brought a class action suit against the
General Services Administration (GSA) to enjoin construction of a
proposed federal building and jail in New York City. Plaintiffs al-
leged that the GSA failed to consider, in its original EIS, the anxiety
and discontentment of area residents from the demolition of existing
structures and construction of the jail.' 4 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that NEPA did not require federal agencies
to consider psychological distaste arising from a proposed action.65
The court found that while crime and noise levels from the proposed
construction could be analyzed quantitatively, psychological reac-
tions have no concrete means of appraisal.66
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a similar
62. Two recent cases, dealing with potential hazards to physical health, provided
two district courts with the opportunity to expand the scope of cognizable environ-
mental impacts under NEPA. In Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428
F. Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977), the United States Forest Service prepared an EIS for the
aerial spraying of herbicides under its Vegetation Managerial Program. The court
issued an injunction holding that the EIS inadequately assessed the effects of a herbi-
cide on human and animal health. Id. at 909. The majority focused on the potential
injuries to human health to justify extending the parameters of NEPA further than
previous cases. Id. at 908-09.
In National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United States Dep't of State,
452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978), a nonprofit corporation brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated NEPA by failing to
prepare an EIS analyzing herbicide spraying of marijuana and poppy plants in Mex-
ico. Declaring that defendants violated NEPA, the court emphasized that the deter-
minative factor was the potential health hazard caused by the spraying. The court
held that where there is a health hazard, NEPA mandates the preparation of an EIS.
Id. at 1234.
63. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
64. Id. at 827.
65. The GSA did not prepare an EIS initially since it determined that the pro-
posed facility would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment.
Id. at 826. See supra notes 3 & 7 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 828. See also Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) (social
values and psychological health factors precluded from judicial review due to
problems of quantification and predictive analyses), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
But see Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1977) (since environmental fac-
tors are not amenable to quantification, absolute quantification is unnecessary); Trout
Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) (formal, mathematical cost-bene-
fit analysis is not required).
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conclusion. In First National Bank of Chicago v. Richardson ,67 plain-
tiffs protested the planned construction of a correctional facility. The
court acknowledged that plaintiffs' psychological concerns were real
but held that fears and sensibilities are not cognizable under
NEPA.6 8
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Peo-
ple Against Nuclear Energy v. Metropolitan Edison Co.69 further ex-
tended the cognizability of potential health hazards under NEPA. It
represented the first time a court has held psychological stress, alleg-
edly arising from the fear of a proposed federal action, to be a pri-
mary impact under NEPA.7° The court found that effects on human
health may include psychological health. 7' The court believed this
was sufficient to require the NRC to assess whether the risk of an
accident at TMI-1 might cause harm to the psychological health of
area residents.72
In reversing the appellate court's decision73 in Metropolitan
Edison," the Supreme Court observed that the lower court's analysis
disregarded an important step: consideration of the causal relation-
ship between changes in the environment and the alleged effects on
its inhabitants.75 To determine when an effect would require assess-
ment under NEPA, the Court promulgated a requirement of a rea-
67. 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973).
68. The Court concluded that: "As regards public 'sensibilities' aroused by crimi-
nal defendants, we question whether such factors, even if amenable to quantification,
are properly cognizable in the absence of clear and continuing evidence that the
safety of the neighborhood is in fact jeopardized." Id. at 1380 n.13. See Nucleus of
Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Hills, 424 U.S. 967 (1976) (fear resulting
from proposed low-income housing project not cognizable under NEPA).
69. 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
70. Id. at 228.
71. Id. The Court relied on legislative history, especially Sen. Jackson's com-
ments, to interpret NEPA's provisions.
72. Id. at 226, 235.
73. 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See supra note 23 for a summary of the appel-
late opinion.
74. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct. 1556
(1983). The only issue addressed by the Court was whether the NRC failed to comply
with NEPA. No party sought review of the court of appeals' holding that permitting
TMI- I to renew operations was a major federal action. Id. at 1557 n.5. Likewise, no
one appealed the AEA holding. Id.
75 103 S. Ct. at 1558.
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sonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical
environment and the effect at issue.7 6
The Court conducted a three-part analysis to conclude that the
causal link between human fear and renewed operation of TMI-1
was too attenuated. First, the Court evaluated the intended scope of
NEPA by looking at the language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory.77 The Court defined the term "environment" to mean physical
environment, and concluded that NEPA does not apply to every ef-
fect arising from a proposed action, but only to effects on the envi-
ronment.78 In reviewing NEPA's legislative history,79 the Court
found that Congress was concerned with human health and wel-
fare."o The Court concluded that the term "environmental impact"
should be read to include a requirement of a reasonably close causal
relationship between impacts on the physical environment and the
effect at issue.81
The majority next considered whether mere risk of environmental
impact can bear a reasonably close causal relationship to the alleged
effects.82 The Court determined that in a causal chain from renewed
76. Id. at 1557-58. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion.
77. Id. at 1560. The Court quoted a portion of 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). It concluded
that the theme of this section "is sounded by the adjective 'environmental'. . . ." Id.
78. Id. The Court, defining the term "environmental" outside the context of
NEPA, determined that "adverse environmental effects" might embrace virtually any
consequence of federal actions. Id. The Court then defined "environment" within
the context of NEPA and concluded that Congress was talking about the physical
environment. Id.
79. The Court quoted statements made by two principal NEPA sponsors, Senator
Jackson and Representative Dingell, which emphasized the congressional intent of
not irreparably damaging the air, aquatic, and terrestrial environments. Id. See
supra note 25 for Senator Jackson's remarks.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 1560-61.
81. The Court illustrated this requirement by discussing the impact arising from
the Department of Health and Human Services implementing extremely strict re-
quirements for health care facilities receiving federal funds. Because these strict stan-
dards would force some facilities to close and raise the price of health care in others,
many people would be unable to afford adequate medical treatment, thereby suffering
severe health damage. The Court concluded that NEPA would not require the De-
partment to prepare an EIS evaluating that health damage because, analogizing to the
tort doctrine of proximate cause, it would not be proximately related to the change in
the physical environment. Id. at 1561.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 1562. The court found that direct effects on the environment
from renewed operation of TMI-I would include release of low-level radiation, in-
creased fog and release of warm water in the Susquehanna River; these effects would
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operation of TMI- 1 to psychological harm, the elements of risk and
its perception by PANE's members are necessary links.83 Because,
by definition, risk is unrealized in the physical world, it cannot con-
stitute an environmental effect.84 The Court concluded that the ele-
ment of risk extended the psychological harm beyond NEPA's
reach.85
Finally, the Court examined whether extending NEPA to include
risks would promote Congress' goals.86 The Court again analyzed
legislative history to determine Congress' intent with respect to psy-
chological harm arising from a "perceptual" action. 7 The Court
then found that requiring agencies to expend considerable resources
developing psychiatric expertise would inhibit them from adequately
pursuing their legislative mandate of protecting the physical environ-
ment.8" Even if federal agencies could develop such expertise, the
Court questioned the effectiveness of distinguishing between genuine
claims of psychological harm and politically-motivated claims.8 9
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, concluded that psychological
injuries are cognizable under NEPA. Nevertheless, he distinguished
the psychological injury at issue from cognizable psychological inju-
ries on the basis of perception of risk.9" He concluded that psycho-
logical harm arising from direct sensory impact due to change of
physical environment would be cognizable under NEPA.91
The Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Edison supports two
require assessment in an EIS. Another cognizable effect would be the impact caused
by the nsk of an accident. The NRC considered, in its original EIS, the possible
effects of a number of accidents that might occur at TMI-I. The Court concluded,
however, that the psychological health damage effect resulting from the risk of nu-
clear accident is not cognizable under NEPA because it is too attenuated. Id. at 1558.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1562.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. "rime and resources are simply too limited for us to believe that Congress
intended to extend NEPA as far as the court [of appeals].., has taken it." 1d.
89. The Court cited two cases which it believed bore a strong resemblance to the
instant case: Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of La-
bor, 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), and First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484
F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973).
90. Id. at 1560 (citing Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv.,
516 F.2d 378, 388 (2d Cir. 1975)).
91. Id.
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interpretations. First, a narrow reading of the Court's holding results
in the conclusion that fear arising from the risk of a proposed action
is too attenuated to require an EIS. The Court establishes the stan-
dard that a change in the physical environment must have a reason-
ably close causal relationship to the effect at issue.9" Applying this
standard, the Court would not require an assessment in cases where
the risk of an effect is a vital middle link between a change in the
physical environment and the psychological harm.93
Metropolitan Edison also could stand for a second proposition:
psychological effects are cognizable under NEPA. Three elements of
the ruling support this proposition. First, the Court recognizes that
all parties to the suit agreed that impacts on human psychological
health may be cognizable under NEPA.94 Second, Brennan's concur-
rence emphasizes that psychological harm comes within the purview
of NEPA.95 Finally, the Court's "impact cognization" standard pro-
vides additional support for this proposition. The majority opinion
does not list all the types of environmental impacts cognizable under
NEPA. The Court instead establishes a standard for application on a
case-by-case basis. Psychological harm would be cognizable under
the Court's standard if it had a reasonably close causal relationship to
the proposed impact.96
Metropolitan Edison is not a setback for NEPA proponents. It will
not permit federal agencies to ignore the environmental effects of
their proposed actions. Rather, by devising the "impact cognization"
standard, Metropolitan Edison alleviates some of the confusion cre-
ated by NEPA's sweeping goals and general language. Thus, while
fear arising from the risks of a proposed action is too attenuated to
compel assessment under the standard, the federal government will
92. Id. at 1557.
93. Thus, the Court implicitly affirms the following decisions because in each case
the change in the physical environment has a reasonably close causal relationship to
the effect at issue: Maryland-Nat'l Capitol Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States
Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (see supra notes 39-46); Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (see supra notes
63-66 and accompanying text); First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d
1369 (7th Cir. 1973) (see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text); Citizens Against
Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977) (see supra note 62).
94. 103 S. Ct. at 1557 (1983).
95. Id. at 1564. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 1558.
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continue to monitor "tangible" impacts on the physical environment
and human health.
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